Theses and Case Law/ Litigation / by Daniel Majewski del Castillo,Zusel Soto Vilchis, and Karla Mishelli Tapia Santos.
In this #ThesisFriday | July 4, 2025, the Judicial Weekly published 74 new rulings: 29 precedents and 45 isolated rulings.
We have selected the most relevant ones for you, which were issued by the Chambers of the SCJN, Collegiate Courts, and Regional Plenary Sessions:
Abstracts
Digital registration: 2030673 / Thesis: 1st/J. 112/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
Simply posting purchasing policies on a website does not imply consumer consent unless there is evidence of access at the time of purchase.
According to Articles 1,794 and 1,796 of the Federal Civil Code, a contract requires informed consent and a lawful purpose to be valid, which means that the consumer must have the full opportunity to understand the contractual obligations at the time of entering into the contract. The Federal Consumer Protection Law reinforces this principle, requiring that, in adhesion contracts—such as the purchase of tickets online—the terms be legible and visible to the consumer at the time of the transaction. Therefore, the mere publication of policies on a website is not sufficient to prove that the consumer was aware of and accepted them, as the provider must ensure that the consumer had clear and timely access to the terms and conditions, thereby fulfilling its obligation to provide transparent information and validate consent.
Digital registration: 2030681 / Thesis: 1a./J. 121/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
Installment Credit as a Standard-Form Contract: An Analysis Under the Protective Provisions of Article 28 of the Constitution.
Since home improvement loan contracts are standard-form contracts drafted unilaterally by financial institutions with uniform terms, they must be analyzed within the protective framework of Article 28 of the Constitution to ensure fairness, transparency, and legal certainty. This entails verifying the absence of abusive, disproportionate, or confusing clauses that undermine the borrower’s rights, as well as ensuring that the banking institution fulfilled its obligation to provide clear and complete information, thereby preventing any infringement of consumer rights.
Digital registration: 2030682 / Thesis: 1st/J. 122/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
A breach of an insurance contract in connection with a medical condition may, in certain circumstances, give rise to a presumption of non-economic damages.
The right to privacy, particularly personal privacy as its most protected aspect, safeguards the most personal aspects of an individual and their family. When an insurer unjustifiably denies payment of health insurance, despite the contractual requirements being met, and demands unnecessary medical examinations (even knowing that the illness is not covered), it not only violates the insured’s legitimate expectations but also infringes upon their privacy by forcing them to disclose intimate aspects of their health. This conduct, according to Article 1916 of the Federal Civil Code, constitutes moral damages by aggravating the suffering of the affected party through an unlawful intrusion into their private sphere.
Digital registration: 2030683 7 Thesis: 1st/J. 123/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
Criteria for awarding punitive damages against insurers for unjustified breach of life and health insurance contracts.
Punitive damages serve as an exemplary sanction in cases of highly reprehensible unlawful conduct, seeking to compensate the victim, punish the liable party, and prevent future violations. In the insurance sector, the imposition of such damages requires the judicial authority to analyze the insurer’s repeated and bad-faith breach of legal obligations—such as providing general terms and conditions with clear exclusions and registering them with the National Insurance and Surety Commission—while assessing the power imbalance and the impact on fundamental rights such as life or health. Its imposition aims to correct abusive practices, ensure corporate accountability, and deter similar conduct, thereby strengthening the protection of financial consumers in particularly vulnerable situations.
Digital registration: 2030708 / Thesis: 1st / J. 120/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
Article 59 of the Amparo Law, which requires a statement “under oath” regarding the facts underlying the challenge, does not violate the right to prompt and impartial justice.
The requirement to “swear to tell the truth” set forth in Article 59 of the Amparo Law, based on Article 130 of the Constitution, is a proportionate and necessary mechanism that ensures the truthfulness of procedural acts, holds the parties accountable for their statements, and allows the court to assess the grounds for recusal with certainty. This requirement does not violate the right to access to justice (Article 17 of the Constitution and Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights), as it prevents unjustified delays by filtering out unfounded recusals, without preventing their reconsideration once formal requirements are met, thereby prioritizing impartiality over procedural technicalities.
Digital registration: 2030709 / Thesis: 1st / J. 119/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
In commercial enforcement proceedings, judges are not required to appoint a third-party expert when there is a conflict between expert opinions.
Judges are not required to appoint a third expert when they can resolve the contradiction between expert opinions through a reasoned assessment, grounded in logic and experience, that explains why they give greater credence to one opinion over another. This judicial discretion does not undermine legal certainty, as Article 1255 of the Commercial Code requires a reasoned explanation for such a decision. The appointment of a third expert is appropriate only when the existing expert opinions are insufficient to form a conviction, thereby avoiding unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.
Digital registration: 2030710 / Thesis: 1a./J. 117/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
For the purposes of calculating the deadline for filing an amparo action, notifications sent by email take effect on the date they are sent (Procedural Law of the State of Sonora).
The time limit for filing an amparo action begins on the day following the date on which the notice of the contested decision takes effect, in accordance with the law applicable to the contested act. In the case of notifications by email, Article 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Sonora establishes that these take effect as of the date of dispatch recorded in the system, without this creating legal uncertainty, since the law requires clear requirements for their validity and guarantees proper communication. This method, although subsidiary, streamlines the process and does not undermine legal certainty, as it provides certainty regarding the content of the decisions, while the parties’ obligation to monitor their email stems from the principle of party autonomy and does not affect their dignity.
Digital registration: 2030710 / Thesis: 1a./J. 117/2025 (11th)
Case Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
Claim for damages in an amparo proceeding: the amount exceeding the bond does not constitute grounds for dismissing the motion.
Article 156 of the Amparo Act allows a third party to file a motion for damages when, following the denial of the amparo, it is established that the suspension granted caused them financial harm. The initial setting of the suspension bond is a provisional calculation based on probabilities; therefore, the motion serves to adjust that amount to a more precise quantification. Claiming an amount greater than the original bond is not grounds for dismissing the motion, since the determination of actual damages pertains to the merits of the case and requires an evidentiary analysis, without its validity being prejudged at an early stage.
Digital registration number: 2030697 / Thesis: I.11o.C. J/27 K (11a.)
Case Law of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
The claim for damages to enforce the guarantee provided in connection with the suspension of the contested actions remains valid, even though the amparo proceeding was dismissed after it was established that the signature on the petition for amparo was forged.
Even though the petitioner did not directly file the amparo action, the fact that it benefited from the suspension of the contested act—by preventing its enforcement while the measure was in effect—and, above all, that it provided the required security, demonstrates its tacit acceptance of the benefit obtained. The voluntary nature of compliance with this requirement (provision of security) demonstrates the complainant’s interest in taking advantage of the effects of the suspension; otherwise, the complainant would not have taken that procedural step.
Digital registration number: 2030662 / Thesis: I.11o.C.57 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The constitutional interpretation of the statute of limitations for third-party beneficiaries to bring an action for specific performance in insurance matters.
Procedural regulations must ensure effective access to justice, avoiding incongruous or disproportionate formalities. In the case of third-party beneficiaries of insurance, the time limit for bringing an action for specific performance (Article 82 of the LISF) must be interpreted in accordance with Articles 14 and 17 of the Constitution, ensuring that the calculation begins only when the beneficiary has actual knowledge of their right. This is justified because, having not participated in the insurance contract, their initial lack of knowledge does not amount to negligence and cannot be penalized. Flexibility in calculating the time limit (always two years from the date of knowledge) balances legal certainty and effective judicial protection, without indefinitely extending the right to claim.
Digital registration number: 2030676 / Thesis: I.15o.C.23 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The rules of interpretation under general contract law apply to reinsurance contracts.
Procedural regulations must ensure effective access to justice, avoiding incongruous or disproportionate formalities. In the case of third-party beneficiaries of insurance, the time limit for bringing an action for specific performance (Article 82 of the LISF) must be interpreted in accordance with Articles 14 and 17 of the Constitution, ensuring that the calculation begins only when the beneficiary has actual knowledge of their right. This is justified because, having not participated in the insurance contract, their initial lack of knowledge does not amount to negligence and cannot be penalized. Flexibility in calculating the time limit (always two years from the date of knowledge) balances legal certainty and effective judicial protection, without indefinitely extending the right to claim.
Digital registration number: 2030678 / Thesis: I.15o.C.22 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
Insurance and reinsurance contracts are legally distinct, as they involve different parties, premiums, and obligations.
Risk is an essential element of an insurance contract, defined as a harmful, future, and uncertain event whose occurrence results in a claim covered by the insurer. When risks are too great for a single company to bear, reinsurance comes into play, through which the insurer transfers part of its risk to another entity to protect itself from losses that exceed its financial capacity. In insurance, risk relates to damage to the insured property, whereas in reinsurance, what is covered are the financial consequences that such damage generates for the insurer. Therefore, insurance and reinsurance contracts are legally distinct, with different parties, premiums, and obligations.
Digital registration number: 2030686 / Thesis: II.2o.A.66 A (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
When a municipal authority fails to fulfill its general obligations to guarantee this human right, the effect of the amparo ruling must be to require the authority to take the necessary measures to ensure access to it.
The human right to water, recognized by the Mexican Constitution and international treaties, obligates the State to guarantee access to water in terms of availability, quality, and accessibility. This right is essential for a life of dignity and the exercise of other rights. Authorities must refrain from limiting access to water, coordinate efforts across the three levels of government, protect citizens from actions that violate this right, and ensure current and future water supply and sanitation. If a municipal authority fails to comply with these obligations, an amparo ruling must require it to take immediate and coordinated action to resolve the water shortage in the community and guarantee this fundamental right.
Digital registration number: 2030698 / Thesis: I.11o.C.104 K (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The action for damages to enforce the guarantee provided in connection with the suspension of the contested acts is governed by the principle of compensation.
The claim for damages in the interlocutory proceeding arising from the suspension of the contested acts is based on the fact that the complaining party did not obtain a favorable judgment. It is not sufficient that the judgment was denied; rather, actual damages and their connection to the preliminary injunction must be demonstrated. The principle of compensation, based on Articles 1 and 17 of the Constitution, requires fair compensation that restores the prior situation or adequately compensates for the damage. This compensation must be proportional, reasonable, and sufficient, regardless of the reason for the unfavorable ruling, whether due to lack of standing or denial of the constitutional remedy.
Digital registration number: 2030704 / Thesis: I.11o.C.49 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
In commercial litigation, the statement “under oath” is not a formal requirement for the complaint or for the filing of a preliminary defense (Article 1390 bis 11 of the Commercial Code).
In commercial litigation, the law requires that the facts on which the complaint is based be stated clearly, precisely, and succinctly, and allows the judge to instruct the plaintiff to correct any deficiencies in accordance with Article 1390 Bis 12 of the Commercial Code. However, neither that article nor Article 1390 Bis 11 authorizes requiring that the facts be stated “under oath,” so imposing this additional requirement violates the right of access to justice enshrined in Article 17 of the Constitution.
Digital registration number: 2030711 / Thesis: I.11o.C.51 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The plea of nullity raised by the guarantor on the grounds that the principal debtor, being illiterate, should have signed the promissory note in the presence of a notary public is not sufficient to invalidate it.
A promissory note is a valid legal instrument if it bears the signatory’s signature, according to the General Law on Credit Instruments and Transactions; therefore, it cannot be deemed invalid due to lack of consent. If the principal debtor is illiterate and signed without the presence of a notary, this could constitute a defect in consent giving rise to relative nullity, which can only be invoked by the debtor and not by the guarantor. The review of the promissory note’s legality on this ground must be conducted solely in favor of the debtor, not the guarantor, who cannot benefit from the debtor’s potential vulnerability. If the debtor did not raise this defense, the promissory note is considered legally issued, and the guarantor remains obligated to fulfill it.
Digital registration number: 2030716 / Thesis: I.11o.C.54 C (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The statute of limitations for the enforcement of a court-approved settlement entered into pursuant to a judgment rendered in a commercial enforcement proceeding does not run during the period in which the court suspended operations due to the health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
Section 1079(IV) of the Commercial Code establishes a three-year period for enforcing judgments and court-approved settlements in commercial enforcement proceedings. This period begins to run from the date of the last judicial act that triggered enforcement. However, if judicial proceedings are suspended during that period, as occurred during the COVID-19 health crisis, the calculation of the period is temporarily halted and resumes upon the lifting of the suspension, without this implying an extension of the statutory period. This suspension does not violate the principle of equality nor does it affect the right of access to justice, since during the closure of the courts it was not possible to pursue enforcement, and time limits run only on business days, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty provided for in Article 14 of the Constitution.
Digital registration number: 2030722 / Thesis: II.2o.A.60 A (11a.)
Individual Opinion of the Circuit Courts
The Superior Chamber of the Administrative Court of the State of Mexico has the authority to order the Regional Chamber of the same Court to request the production or examination of evidence it deems necessary and relevant to ascertaining the truth of the matter.
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the State of Mexico, the Administrative Court of Justice may, at any time, order the collection or expansion of evidence necessary to clarify a matter. This power must be exercised particularly when the existing evidence raises reasonable doubt regarding the plaintiff’s claim. In such cases, the Superior Chamber must instruct the Regional Chamber to reopen the proceedings and request from the defendant authority—and other competent authorities—the information necessary to ascertain the truth, taking into account the records they are required to maintain under the law.
Digital registration number: 2030703 / Thesis: PR.A.C.CN. J/83 A (11th)
Case Law of Regional Circuit Courts
The administrative notice does not constitute a final decision for the purposes of administrative litigation.
The Second Chamber of the SCJN, in resolving the conflict of legal opinions 79/2002-SS, established that a “final administrative decision” for the purposes of administrative litigation requires not only that no ordinary appeals remain pending against it, but also that it constitute the final act of the authority, whether as the conclusion of a proceeding or as an act that autonomously reflects its definitive will. Applying this criterion, an official letter from ISSSTECALI requesting supplementary documents (such as an employer’s statement) under penalty of deeming the pension application not filed is not a final decision, as it does not issue a final ruling on the individual’s substantive right, but merely requests prior information. This is consistent with Article 30 of the Law of the State Administrative Court of Baja California, which requires, for a decision to be final, that it be impossible to modify it through ordinary appeals, while acknowledging the non-conclusive nature of purely procedural acts such as the letter in question.
Digital registration number: 2030675 / Thesis: PR.P.T.CS.8 K (11th ed.)
Isolated Thesis: Regional Circuit Plenary Sessions
A conflict of legal principles is irrelevant once res judicata applies.
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that for res judicata to apply in a subsequent proceeding, certain formal elements—such as the parties, subject matter, and cause of action—and substantive elements—such as the identity of the claims, the existence of a decision on the merits, and compliance with essential procedural requirements—must be met. If these elements are satisfied in a case that conflicts with a prior one, the new case will be dismissed due to the existence of res judicata.
Prepared by Daniel Majewski del Castillo,Zusel Soto Vilchis, and Karla Mishelli Tapia Santos.
